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Abstract 
 
A critical challenge facing developing country producers is to meet international labour standards 
and codes of conduct in order to engage in global production networks. Evidence of gains for 
workers from compliance with such standards and codes remains limited and patchy. This paper 
focuses on the global football industry, a sector dominated by leading global brands who manage 
dispersed global production networks. It assesses the work conditions for football stitchers engaged 
in different forms of work organisation, factories, stitching centres, and home-based settings, in 
Pakistan, India, and China. It draws on detailed qualitative primary field research with football 
stitching workers and producers in these three countries. The paper explains how, and why, work 
conditions of football stitchers differ across these locations through an analytical framework that 
interweaves both global and local production contexts that influence work condition. In doing so, it 
argues that current debates on the role of labour in global production networks have to go beyond a 
narrow focus on labour standards and CSR compliance and engage with economic, technological 
and social upgrading as factors that could generate sustained improvements in real wages and 
workers conditions.  
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1. Introduction 
Football is acknowledged to be the most popular sport on the planet. International trade in inflatable balls has 
grown systematically over the past decade and is close to US$ 1 billion (Nadvi et al forthcoming).
1
  A small 
number of leading global brands dominate the organisation of football manufacturing by sourcing through 
independent suppliers. These include Adidas, Asics, Mitre, Mizuno, Nike, Puma, Reebok, and Umbro (Lund-
Thomsen and Nadvi 2010). In recent years, there has been greater consolidation amongst the brands, with 
Adidas acquiring Reebok in 2005 and Nike taking over Umbro in 2007. By 2009, Adidas – in its own 
estimate - accounted for 34% of the global football business and reported sales of US$ 1.57 billion from 
football related merchandizing whereas Nike generated US$ 1.7 billion from sales of footballs and football 
related products (Nadvi et. al., forthcoming). Brands source footballs from four distinct Asian 
production locations, China, Pakistan, Thailand and India. China dominates the manufacture of low 
to medium quality machine-stitched balls, while Pakistan is the leading producer for high quality 
hand-stitched ‘match’ balls2. Thailand’s niche was premium thermo-moulded balls, but this is now 
also produced in China. India’s production is primarily of low to medium quality hand-stitched 
footballs. 
 
There have been two key developments in football manufacturing in recent years. First, given the 
global cultural prominence of the sport, and the high profile of the leading brands, a range of labour 
standard concerns have affected global production networks in football manufacturing. Pakistan and 
India have faced challenges on child labour. This led to the implementation of a multi-stakeholder 
initiative to monitor labour and to address the causes of child labour (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 
2010). In China, pressures on overtime, working conditions and concerns with the use of prison 
labour led to stricter enforcement of codes of conduct by the brands in their Chinese supply chains 
(Nadvi et. al., forthcoming, Xue et. al., forthcoming). Second, there has been systematic 
technological upgrading in product and process activities, with more advanced footballs and more 
mechanised forms of production. However, technological upgrading has been geographically 
uneven with China taking the lead and India as well as Pakistan attempting to catch up (Nadvi 
forthcoming). 
 
                                                          
1
 Inflatable balls include volleyballs, rugby balls, basketballs as well as footballs. Footballs, or what in the US is called 
soccer balls, are considered the largest single category and are the focus of this study. 
2
 ‘Match’ balls are footballs used in actual professional tournaments and the leading international football clubs. 
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This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on labour in GPNs through empirical evidence. We 
assess the similarities and the differences in the work conditions of football stitchers engaged in 
factory, stitching centre, and home-based work in Pakistan, India, and China and try to explain why 
we observe these similarities and differences. We draw on detailed comparative research 
undertaken in China, India and Pakistan from 2007 to 2010, including interviews with suppliers, 
contractors, and workers as well as with the leading global brands. Finally, we argue that it is 
important to not only explore how the sourcing and CSR policies of internationally branded 
companies affect work conditions at supplier factories in developing countries, but also to recognize 
that a broader set of local and global causal factors are likely to influence workers’ conditions in 
export-oriented industries. We suggest this might be achieved by drawing on insights gained from a 
range of interrelated literatures including work on global value chains, on industrial upgrading in 
these chains, and on local production organization. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The following section briefly describes the core features and 
trends in the global football manufacturing industry.  Section 3 details our methodology. Section 4 
presents an analytical framework to explain how similarities and differences in work conditions in 
the labour-intensive, export-oriented football manufacturing industry can be understood.  Section 5 
charts the main findings on work conditions and outcomes for factory-based, centre-based, and 
home-based football stitchers in Pakistan, India, and China. Section 6 provides an analytical 
explanation behind the differences in wages and work conditions across the three locations and its 
relationship to industrial upgrading/downgrading, GPN governance, and production organization in 
national institutional contexts. Finally, the conclusion considers the implications of this study for 
further policy and research on labour in global production networks.  
 
2 The Global Football Manufacturing Industry: A brief overview.        
As Figure 1 shows China’s dominance in global exports of inflatable balls has been growing since 
2003, whereas Pakistan and Thailand have been largely stagnant during the same period.  
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Figure 1: Exports of Inflatable Balls from China, Pakistan, Thailand and India, 2003 – 2009 (US$000) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade 2010 
 
The Pakistani football industry consists of around 390 producers located in and around the city of 
Sialkot in Punjab. This used to be world’s leading centre for football manufacturing until the late 
1990s. Sialkot’s producers traditionally prided themselves in their knowledge of high quality hand-
stitching with the Sialkot cluster producing the entire range of high-quality match balls, medium 
quality training balls, and lower quality promotional balls. The Chinese football manufacturing  
sector consists of approximately 200 suppliers (Global Sources 2006). Chinese factories 
predominantly use machine-stitching technology. Football manufacturing is concentrated in 
Guangdong and Jiangsu provinces. Some of the largest manufacturers are also located in Fujian and 
Jiangxi provinces and in Shanghai. Investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan played a key role in 
the development of the Chinese football industry. The Indian football manufacturing industry is 
mainly located in the city of Jalandhar. The Jalandhar cluster is relatively small with only 150 
exporting enterprises and a daily output of 45,000 inflatable balls. By contrast, the largest machine-
stitching factory in China can produce 70,000 footballs a day. Jalandhar specializes in the hand-
stitching of footballs although a few manufacturers have now also started machine-stitching. In 
Thailand, football production is dominated by a small handful of large producers engaged in 
machine-stitching of footballs. The profile of Thailand’s football manufacturing industry was raised 
in 2004 as the Japanese-owned firm, Molten, produced the first mechanized thermo-moulded ball 
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for Adidas. This was used for the European Cup tournament. However, in 2010 Adidas shifted its 
sourcing of thermo-moulded balls from Thailand to a supplier in Guangdong. 
 
A common feature of the football manufacturing industry in Pakistan, India, and to a lesser extent 
China is the extensive use of subcontracting. In Pakistan and India, the process of stitching the balls 
is outsourced from the factory to keep overhead costs down, circumvent local labour laws, and 
retain flexibility in relation to seasonal changes in football demand. Outsourcing is done through 
subcontractors of whom there are approximately 2,450 in Sialkot and 1000 in Jalandhar.  They 
serve as a link between suppliers and stitchers in both Sialkot and Jalandhar. Only one or two firms 
in both clusters directly employ their own stitchers. In both clusters, stitchers are generally either 
employed by the sub-contractors, or self-employed, and are paid on a piece-rated basis, with rates 
varying according to the type and quality of ball being stitched. In Sialkot, stitching takes place in 
2,600 registered stitching centres and in Jalandhar approximately 3,000 registered centres have been 
identified. Stitching centres are designated sites – e.g., a rented building or an open courtyard - 
where the stitching of footballs takes place. Centres are usually managed by sub-contractors, and 
each centre is linked to, and undertakes work for, a specific manufacturer. Registration implies that 
these centres are monitored by the child labour monitoring programmes that operate in each cluster 
(Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2009).  
 
Stitching centres vary in size. Sialkot’s large centres accommodate between 100-500 stitchers, 
medium-sized centres have 50-100 stitchers, smaller centres have 10-50 stitchers, and home-based 
stitching centres have less than 10 stitchers. In addition, there are some non-registered home-based 
stitching locations, although it is difficult to estimate their number. Home-based stitching is often a 
full-time occupation in Sialkot and Jalandhar although some female stitchers in Sialkot mainly 
stitch on a part-time basis to supplement their family’s income. In Jalandhar, approximately 30 
stitching centres are small to medium-sized whereas the remainder are home-based units. There are 
numerous unregistered stitching locations in Jalandhar (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010).  
 
In China, the process of subcontracting takes place from larger machine-based first-tier suppliers in 
Guangdong to smaller second-tier suppliers in Guangdong or other provinces such as Jiangsu where 
stitching sometimes takes place in townships or rural areas. Subcontracting has been extensively 
used in relation to the hand-stitching of footballs by some of the larger manufacturers based in 
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Shanghai to Jiangsu province where stitching was carried out in designated centres, informal 
workshops or the homes of village-based stitchers. In China, home-based stitching is mostly a part-
time activity that helps rural women generate some additional income. Some suppliers, especially 
smaller producers and subcontractors based in Jiangsu, outsource both hand- and machine-stitching 
to local prisons (see Xue et. al., forthcoming). 
 
3. Methodology 
We undertook a full mapping of the supply chains and work forms found in the football 
manufacturing industries in Pakistan, India, and China as an entry point to investigating work 
conditions amongst factory, stitching centre, and home-based stitchers in this industry. This was 
done through interviews with key informants and academics, as well as with international buyers, 
local suppliers, contractors/subcontractors, and football stitchers in each country. In Pakistan we 
found home-based, centre-based, and factory-based stitching. In India, the dominant work forms 
were centre and home-based stitching.
3
 In contrast, factory-based stitching was the only work form 
observed in the leading football manufacturing region in Guangdong province in South China.  In 
Jiangsu province in East China, the second largest manufacturing region in the country, factory-
based and home-based stitching were the dominant work forms. 
Our initial hypothesis was that work conditions in the football manufacturing industries of Pakistan, 
India, and China vary according to the type of work form and supply chain that football stitchers are 
inserted into. We expected that conditions would be better in the more regulated, formal factory 
work environments where stitchers would be covered by local labour law protection and worsen as 
we moved to the semi-formal stitching centres and the informal settings of home-based stitching 
locations operating outside the remit of labour laws. Similarly, we expected that stitchers were 
likely to experience the best work conditions if they were engaged in supply chains of CSR-
sensitive mega-brands, such as Nike and Adidas. At the same time, we felt that football stitchers 
may experience the worst conditions when inserted into chains that supplied non-CSR sensitive 
buyers.  
                                                          
3
 It should be noted that factory-based machine-stitching was introduced in two factories in Jalandhar in 2008/9. 
However, the total number of these workers – around 50 – could not be considered a dominant work form when 
compared to the total number of stitchers in the Jalandhar football cluster.  
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Based on these considerations we interviewed workers across the range of dominant work forms in 
each location. Although our sample sizes of firms and workers are small, and cannot claim to be 
representative, they were purposively selected to give an indicative picture of dominant work 
practices in each location.  We also interviewed the leading global and regional brands, including 
Nike, Adidas, the UK-brand Pentland-Mitre, the Danish brand Select Sports and smaller specialized 
brands such as Fairdeal Trading. Interviews with the brands were carried out in Europe, the United 
States and with brand’s representatives and sourcing offices in Pakistan and China.  
In all three countries we interviewed a limited number of suppliers that fed into the different chains. 
In Pakistan we interviewed four large enterprises, three medium-sized enterprises, and four small 
enterprises. Similarly, we undertook five medium-sized enterprises, and four small enterprises in 
India. In Guangdong province we undertook six firm interviews, 2 with large factories, 2 with small 
factories, and 2 trading houses. In Jiangsu province we carried out 11 interviews with small and 
medium-sized manufacturers. Going further down the supply chain we interviewed six 
subcontractors in Pakistan and seven in India. Our interviews with brands, local suppliers and 
subcontractors were qualitative in nature and we focused on seeking to understand intra-chain 
relationships, the ways in which concerns on labour standards and CSR factored into these ties, and 
their implications for the distinct category of actors within the chain.  
Finally, we conducted a total of 127 individual open-ended questionnaire interviews with football 
stitchers in Pakistan, India, and China. As shown below (Table 1) these were distributed according 
to the different work forms prevalent in each location.  No interviews were carried out in work 
premises as this could compromise workers and impact on the quality of information we obtained. 
Hence, in Pakistan and India all worker interviews were undertaken in workers’ homes, and we 
used a range of local key informants and snowballing techniques to identify stitchers engaged in 
different types of work forms. In China, we conducted interviews with workers outside the factories 
in Guangdong, usually meeting workers either during their lunch breaks or in the evening when 
they were not under observation by supervisors and managers. In Jiangsu, we could only conduct a 
very limited number of interviews with home-based stitchers due to difficulties in accessing these 
stitchers. In each location we endeavoured to follow proper ethical protocols, in particular ensuring 
confidentiality.  
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Table 1: Stitching Workers Interviewed by Work Form in Pakistan, India, and China 
 
Work Form 
 
Pakistan 
 
India 
 
China 
 
Total 
Factory Based 
Work 
14 0 41 55 
Centre-Based 
Work 
19 14 0 33 
Home-Based 
Work 
17 15 7 39 
Total 50 29 48 127 
 
Our worker level interviews sought to explore worker backgrounds, working conditions, income 
levels, skill acquisition, understanding of CSR and labour standard concerns as well as labour 
activism and broader worker perceptions of their experience of work. We triangulated the 
information obtained through these interviews with reviews of international and national newspaper 
articles in Pakistan, India, and China; previous writings on the football industry (e.g., R. Khan 
2007, A. Khan 2007); and through policy documents and reports produced by international aid 
agencies, local industry organizations, and market research companies.  We also reviewed the 
websites – in particular the ethical guidelines– of internationally branded companies and studied 
national labour laws in each country. We carried out participatory observation during several 
factory tours, visits to stitching centres, and rural/urban areas where home-based stitching took 
place.  During these visits we took extensive fieldwork notes and produced village and factory 
profiles of the localities where stitchers lived and worked. In addition, we carried out a wide range 
of interviews with other stakeholders that had an involvement in the football manufacturing 
industry. These included interviews with representatives of international aid agencies in Europe and 
Asia – in particular the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), as well as repeated discussions with local industry 
associations in Sialkot and Jalandhar, national government officials, NGOs and trade unions 
working to support stitchers, as well as ethical and fair trade consultants working in the industry. 
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4.  Global Value Chains, Industrial Upgrading and Local Production Contexts: Implications 
for labour in football manufacturing 
How do we explain the similarities and differences in work conditions of football stitchers in 
Pakistan, India, and China that participate in different work forms and value chains? Two distinct, 
yet inter-related, bodies of literature have addressed the role of labour in global production. First, 
scholars working on the inter-related concepts of global value chains (GVC) and global production 
networks (GPN) have argued that global lead firms play a critical role in the organization of GVCs 
(Gereffi et al 2005; Kaplinsky 2005), and that inter-firm relationships within GPNs are both socially 
embedded as well as influenced by a range of multi-scalar factors – from government regulations, 
international trade agreements to local norms and practices (Henderson et al 2002; Coe et al 2008). 
Central to the organization of GVCs and GPNs has been international standards, relating to health 
and safety, quality assurance, environmental impacts and working conditions (Nadvi 2008; Ponte 
and Gibbon 2005). Meeting such standards, it is argued, can be necessary for developing country 
producers to engage in such global networks (Nadvi and Waltring 2004). Second, the literature on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) has sought to understand how firms integrate social and 
environmental concerns into core business practices in ways that raise value as well as address the 
interests of distinct stakeholders (Blowfeld and Frynas 2005). In this area there has been concern 
with how ‘voluntary’ CSR codes are implemented by suppliers, the extent to which this permeates 
down the supply chain, and the implications that this has for brands and workers.  
The GPN/GVC and CSR literatures are beginning to converge as it becomes apparent that the 
structural dynamics of global competition and global sourcing, which result in higher returns for 
companies and shareholders and demand lower costs and shorter lead times for workers and 
suppliers, can accentuate non-compliance with labour standards and codes of conduct. Squaring 
these two, apparently disarticulated, challenges can be a major struggle for developing country 
suppliers, and have led to calls for more ‘just’ supply chains (Locke et. al., 2009). However, a 
critical gap in both bodies of literature is their limited understanding of the role of labor, in 
particular the potential gains to, and consequences for, workers arising from their participation in 
global value chains.  In part, this reflects the focus within the GVC/GPN and CSR literatures with 
firms (or global corporations) viewed as the primary unit of analysis.  
Recently a number of scholars have begun to recognise this disjuncture. Coe and Jordhus-Lier 
(2010) have linked the rich literature on labour geography to GPN analysis, and argued for a more 
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critical understanding of labour agency.  Barrientos et. al., (2010) and Milberg and Winkler (2010) 
have explored the inter-relationship between economic and social upgrading within GPNs, and the 
consequences for worker livelihoods and working conditions from engagement with GPNs. 
Empirically, there have been attempts to assess the impact of codes of conduct on workers (Locke 
et al 2007, Barrientos and Smith 2007, Chan and Siu 2010, Sum and Pun 2005).
4
 Some studies 
concluding that codes act as ‘window dressing’ by failing to address core labour rights (Pun 2005, 
Xue, 2011). Given this experience, some practitioners and academics have advocated a ‘cooperation 
paradigm’ to improve workers’ conditions in supplier factories (Locke et. al., 2009, Oxfam 2010).5  
In seeking to understand outcomes for workers from participation in global production networks we 
argue that a combination of possible vertical (global value chain) and horizontal (national and local 
institutional context) factors, and their dynamic interaction, is required. The challenge is not to use 
either vertical analysis or horizontal analysis to understand the conditions of workers in developing 
countries that produce for global markets. Instead, the challenge is to understand how global and 
local factors mutually condition, reinforce or contradict one another in different and shifting 
constellations, thus creating similar and differential outcomes for workers at particular moments in 
time (Neilson and Pritchard 2009, 2010). A critical factor, at the level of both vertical (global) and 
horizontal (local) ties or contexts, is upgrading and its consequences for workers. On this basis, we 
then develop an analytical framework for understanding the interplay between vertical and 
horizontal forms of analysis with reference to the international football manufacturing industry. 
                                                          
4
Evidence of actual outcomes for workers from such initiatives suggests, however, that gains are at best patchy 
(Barrientos and Smith 2007, Locke et al 2007, Chan and Siu 2010, Sum and Pun 2005, Pun 2005).Improvements can be 
identified on tangible issues such as occupational health and safety (OHS) and limits on excessive overtime, but 
implementation of codes of conduct have had little direct impact on issues of labour rights such as freedom of 
association and collective bargaining (Chan and Ross 2003, ETI 2006, Barrientos and Smith 2007). It is also apparent 
that codes of conduct do not cover more vulnerable segments of the workforce in developing countries such as home-
based, temporary workers, or casual workers, many of whom are women (Nelson et al. 2007). Studies have further 
highlighted the lack of coordination between the purchasing and CSR departments of international brands, and the 
distinct and competing pressures that they place on global suppliers (Barrientos and Smith 2007).  
5
The main features of this are the need for:  (i) better co-ordination between the purchasing and compliance departments 
of international brands; (ii) greater co-operation between brands and suppliers to help suppliers upgrade their products 
and production processes; (iii) greater interaction between brands and local NGOs and trade unions in training workers 
in their legal rights and the brands’ codes of conduct; (iv) adopting a system of ‘mature industrial relations’ to improve 
work conditions and secure enabling rights such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; and (v) 
continued and better engagement by private sector companies, NGOs, trade unions, and/or government representatives 
within multi-stakeholder initiatives that facilitate cross-sector learning and foster innovative solutions to complex 
challenges such as child labour or home-based work (Locke et. al., 2009, IDH 2009, Miller et. al., 2010).   
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This is inspired by particular bodies of theoretical literature – on industrial upgrading, on GVCs, on 
GPNs, as well local forms of production organization in developing countries.  
                                
Industrial Upgrading vs. Downgrading 
We might be able to explain similarities and differences in work conditions at the bottom of global 
value chains with reference to the literature on industrial upgrading. As more and more low-cost 
producers enter the global economy, local suppliers in developing countries face a dilemma in terms 
of how they can survive in the face of increasing competition from other low-cost regions. Hence, 
developing country suppliers face a choice between engaging in the so-called high road or low road 
to competitiveness. The aim of the high road to competitiveness is to increase financial returns to 
local enterprises by engaging in product, process, functional or intersectoral upgrading strategies. 
That is, producing better products more efficiently, moving into higher value added activities e.g., 
design and branding of products, or by employing skills gained in one industry to become 
competitive in a related industry (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002, Schmitz 2004). Suppliers may also 
adopt a low road to competitiveness that is based upon a downgrading strategy. Downgrading 
involves moving into lower value-added activities, squeezing labour by providing lower wages, and 
failing to abide by social and environmental laws that regulate production in export-oriented 
industries (Kaplinsky 2005, Gibbon and Ponte 2005). In other words, we might be able to explain 
similarities and differences in work conditions within the same export oriented industry across 
different producer countries by looking at whether local suppliers follow the high or the low road to 
competitiveness.   
 
Global Value Chain Governance 
In global value chains, lead firms have the potential to exercise considerable influence over their 
supplier through their governance of the chain; i.e. by deciding what is to be produced, where, 
under what conditions, and for what price (Gereffi et al. 2005). In the case of football 
manufacturing, international buyers may play a key role in demanding continuous price declines 
from their suppliers or by compelling their suppliers in different regions to compete on the basis of 
price by informing them of what prices their competitors can offer.  Naturally, this severely 
constrains the financial returns that local suppliers and stitchers can generate from participating in 
the global football manufacturing value chain.  International buyers also play a key role in 
determining what kinds of footballs are to be produced. By favouring particular types of football, 
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e.g., thermo-moulded or machine-stitched balls over hand-stitched balls, they can influence the 
amount of work available to local suppliers and stitchers in Pakistan, India, and China.  Global 
brands play a key role in coordinating and organizing the GVC for football production by 
influencing how footballs are to be produced  For example, international buyers often determine 
how balls are produced by specifying particular technical, social and environmental requirements 
that local suppliers must abide by. This can have either positive or negative implications for 
workers. On the one hand, the CSR aspirations of global buyers may favour the hiring of full-time, 
formally registered workers, working in factory-based settings and covered by national labour and 
environmental legislation. On the other hand, the enforcement of codes of conduct could exclude 
smaller-scale manufacturers and stitchers employed in the informal economy, e.g., home-based 
stitchers, from participating in the higher-value added parts of the global football manufacturing 
chain. Buyers can also influence when footballs are to be produced. International demand for 
footballs peaks each year between October and March in preparation for summer season in 
developed countries while also following a two-year cycle that coincides with the run up to either 
the European or World Cup Tournaments.  International buyers of footballs mediate this demand by 
placing their production orders in preparation for these events. The implications for workers of 
these changing production cycles could either be excessive work – in the form of overtime – or too 
little work – in terms of job and income insecurity.   
 
Local Forms of Production Organization  
Similarly, various forms of local production organization in particular regions may play important 
roles in determining how footballs are to be stitched. At one extreme, some localities may seek to 
use mass production techniques involving very large firms whose workers have to perform strictly 
demarcated, often repetitive tasks in producing large volumes of standardized goods. Mass 
production involves the mechanization of production to achieve economies of scale and forms of 
work organization that serve to increase productivity, thus lowering unit labour costs (Kiely 1998). 
At the other extreme, some localities may seek to be competitive by being located in small firm 
industrial clusters that are co-located within a defined geographical space. In such clusters, 
information flows quickly between firms in the cluster, each firm tends to specialize in a given part 
of the production process and the use of subcontracting or so-called job working is extensive to 
meet changing demands of international buyers. In this model of local economic organization, an 
available pool of skill workers is found in cluster settings and local support institutions develop 
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forward and backward linkages, small firms tend to specialize in small batch production, and split 
up individual parts of the value chain into a large number of production units that are closely co-
located within the boundaries of the cluster (Kiely 1998).   
 
Mass production within factories potentially creates the opportunity for workers to engage in 
collective action through representative trade bodies. Where effective, such forms of labour agency 
and mobilisation can lead to higher wages and better job security. However, being involved in mass 
production may also result in increased management control and supervision of workers. As a 
result, workers may adopt a hostile stance towards their employers and use demarcation strategies, 
only performing what is stated in their employment contract while refusing to share their knowledge 
of what works and what does not work at the production line with their employers (Bradley et al. 
2000). In industrial cluster settings, the use of subcontracting and flexible production might also 
have the advantages of fulfilling the needs of those workers who do not feel that full-time 
employment serves their particular needs. For some it may provide better possibilities for 
combining work and family life.  
 
However, the use of subcontracting in clusters may also have a downside for workers. The kind of 
reorganization of value chains is often seen as weakening the demands of labour for better work 
conditions. First, outsourcing is often accompanied by deregulation and decentralized bargaining, as 
suppliers are unlikely to be covered by collective industry agreements. Second, as witnessed 
through outsourcing of production to locations in the developing world, the core workforce in the 
developed world is often under pressure to make concessions on their employment conditions in 
order to be able to keep their jobs. Third, outsourcing leaves peripheral workers to cope with the 
disadvantages and risks of cost-cutting and flexibility (Flecket 2009, p. 253), resulting in income 
and employment insecurity.  
 
5. Similarities and Differences in Work Condition           
Earlier we outlined an analytical framework to help explain similarities and differences in the work 
conditions of football stitchers. This focused on the role of industrial upgrading/downgrading, 
global value chain governance, and production organization in national institutional contexts. Here 
we present the main findings gleaned from our worker level interviews of work conditions of 
factory, centre-based, and home-based football stitchers in Pakistan, India, and China. An overview 
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of the similarities and differences in work conditions are listed in Table 2 below. This evidence 
needs to be treated with some caution given that our sample size in each location and distinct work 
form was small. Thus, we make no claim that this data is representative. Nevertheless, the data 
provides indicative insights into differences across the three country locations and work forms. 
Table 2: An Overview of Work Conditions for Stitchers in Pakistan, India, and China by Work Form. 
 Sialkot Jalandhar Guangdong 
Workform Factory Centre Home Centre Home Factory 
Median 
Monthly Wage 
(in PPP $)
67
 
262 190 78 182 177 439 
Median Hourly 
Wage (in 
nominal US$) 
0.38 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.15 0.89 
Weekly    Work 
Days 
6.0 6.0 6.2 6.0 6.4 6.0 
Daily Work 
Hours
8
 
9.1 7.8 7.5 7.2 8.1 10.3 
Child Labour 
 
Absent Absent Unknown  Limited Limited Absent 
Unionization &  
Collective 
Bargaining 
No No No No No No 
Social 
Insurance 
Wide 
Coverage 
No No No No Limited Coverage 
Source: Authors’ survey 
                                                          
6
 Wages were calculated in the following ways. In China, the monthly wages were entered as per the responses of the 
stitchers interviewed. In Pakistan and in India, wages were calculated by multiplying the average rate received per 
football by the stitcher interviewed and then multiplying this by the average number of balls stitched by the stitcher per 
day. Finally, this number was multiplied by the number of working days for each stitcher month. This method was 
adopted for India and Pakistan given the low literacy rates amongst football stitchers who were often not in a position to 
calculate their exact monthly wages. This was then converted into purchasing power party $ using the World Bank’s 
PPP conversion rates.  
7
 In national currencies, the median monthly incomes were as follows in nominal terms: Pakistan – Factory (PKR 
7540), centre (PKR 5460), and home (PKR 2275). In India, centre (INR 3000) and home (INR 2925). In China 
(Guangdong): Factory (RMB 1625). 
8
 For factory-based football stitchers work hours were entered on the basis of actual hours spent inside the factory/the 
stitching center for work purposes. For home-based stitchers, we asked about their daily routines, when they began, 
took breaks, resumed football stitching, and finished at the end of the day. This was necessary as stitchers themselves 
did not always have a clear idea of how many hours they actually spent on football stitching. 
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What is apparent from our data is that, as expected, factory-based football stitchers earn the highest 
monthly incomes. This is across the three country locations as well as within Pakistan (the only 
location where all three forms of work organisation were observed). We present wage data first in 
terms of purchasing power parity dollars. This provides a more effective basis to capture the 
comparative real wage levels across the three locations. At the top are Chinese factory-based 
football stitchers in Guangdong who earned the equivalent of PPP$ 439 a month.
9
 This was 40% 
more than their Pakistani factory-based counterparts who earned PPP$ 262 home per month. In 
terms of centre and home-based stitchers, we find that Pakistani centre-based football stitchers, 
Indian centre, and home-based football stitchers in our sample earn almost identical monthly 
incomes at PPP$ 190, 182 and 177.   
When we review the nominal wages (that is to say not converted in PPP terms) we see that the 
wages differences between China and the South Asian locations are even more sharply defined. As 
shown in Table 2, the hourly nominal wages in Chinese factories (US$ 0.89) are more than double 
the hourly wage in Pakistani factories (US$ 0.38) and more than three times as high as nominal 
wages in Indian stitching centres (US$ 0.24). While the PPP wage levels provide an indication of 
real wages, the nominal hourly wages provide a better sense of how comparative wage rates may 
affect the sourcing decisions of global buyers.  
Football stitching can be seasonal in line with international demand for footballs, and some stitchers 
especially in India and Pakistan reported that they often did not obtain stitching work for months at 
a time. However, when there were enough order stitchers in Pakistan, India, and China generally 
worked six days a week.
10
 Although, in terms of daily work hours, there was a large difference 
between Chinese and South Asian football stitchers. Chinese factory-based football stitchers in our 
sample worked longer hours on average (10.3 hours a day) than their South Asian counterparts.  
Overtime payments did not apply to Pakistani and Indian home and centre-based stitchers given that 
they did not have any contract defining their work relationship and working hours  with the 
suppliers whose balls they stitched. In the case of China however, factory-based stitchers generally 
                                                          
9
 In contrast, anecdotal evidence suggest that home-based football stitchers in Jiangsu province earn about PPP$ 65 – 
92 a month. 
10
 The average for India is somewhat higher, but not significant given the small number of home-based stitchers in our 
Indian sample where a few outliers responded that they also worked on Sundays. 
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indicated that they do work overtime while home-based stitchers in Jiangsu did not receive any 
overtime payment.
11
  
On occupational health and safety (OHS) our findings reveal that the vast majority of football 
stitchers in China using machine-stitching report that they do not suffer from OHS problems related 
to football stitching. This is in contrast to Indian and Pakistani football stitchers using hand 
stitching, where OHS problems related to deformed fingertips, shoulder and elbow inflammations, 
arm pain and back pain were common. In India, 100% of the home-based and centre-based stitchers 
reported suffering from health related problems as a result of their stitching work. In Pakistan, some 
factory-based stitchers indicated that they suffered OHS problem while most centre- based stitchers 
(70.6%) and home-based stitchers (93.3%) stated that they had faced OHS problems.  
Contrary to earlier research in Sialkot and Jalandhar (see e.g., Husselbee 2000, Goyal 2004, 2005), 
we found little evidence to suggest that football stitching was still undertaken with the help of child 
labour in either Pakistan (Sialkot), India (Jalandhar) or China (Guangdong).
12
 Our own field-level 
observations in Sialkot and Jalandhar suggest that child labour has been substantially diminished if 
not virtually eliminated from export-oriented manufacturing of footballs.
13
 In Jiangsu province, we 
found anecdotal evidence to suggest that prison labour was involved in the stitching of footballs. 
While we were unable to ascertain how widespread this practice is, a subcontractor in Jiangsu 
province offered that he could get us 3000 balls stitched in a prison while a factory told us that they 
had set up a production facility for machine-stitching inside a prison. During an internet search we 
also came across a prison that – in Chinese – publicly advertised its ability to supply footballs (see 
Xue et al. forthcoming).     
Our research shows that unionization is generally absent in football stitching in Pakistan, India, and 
Chinese. In Pakistan factory-based work an attempt has been made at setting up worker committees. 
                                                          
11
 The number of valid responses in our sample of Pakistani factory-based stitchers was too low to make any firm 
conclusions regarding overtime in that particular setting. 
12
 The only exception to this is that in our field research in India we did come across one stitching family in Batala 
where a female stitcher was assisted by her children in some light tasks once they came back from school, while a 
stitcher working in a centre claimed that children were involved in stitching there but ran away when the child labour 
monitors come. In Pakistan, the Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labour reported to us that it usually 
finds 2 to 3 children a month during its visits to stitching centers in Sialkot out of a total work force of approximately 
30,000 registered stitchers. 
13
 A recent NGO report (ILRF/BBVA, 2008) documented the extensive use of child labor in the football manufacturing 
cluster of Meerut in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. However, the football cluster in Meerut is not primarily engaged 
in export-oriented production whereas this article focuses on the main export-oriented cluster of India, Jalandhar. 
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However, these have been largely unsuccessful in terms of protecting workers’ rights. In India, an 
official trade union does exist for football stitchers. However, it is largely ineffective, with a limited 
membership, and receives money from local entrepreneurs to curb its demands. In terms of 
industrial action, however, we found evidence of factory-based stitchers in Pakistan and China 
spontaneously organizing to defend their rights. In Pakistan, a strike was spontaneously undertaken 
with the aim of pressurizing factory management in the main Nike supplier in Sialkot. The strike 
happened during the financial crisis in mid-2009 where the factory was forced to temporarily lay off 
a large number of workers. It appeared as if factory management intentionally miscalculated the 
factory-based stitchers monthly wages. However, once stitchers became aware of this, they stopped 
work and only resumed once they had obtained a promise from the factory owner that due wages 
would be paid in full. Similarly, on 7 May 2009, two thousand workers in a large export-oriented 
factory in Guangdong because of the re-location of the factory relocation and the dismissal of 
workers without full compensation for wages due.
14
 On June 7, 2010, more than one thousand 
workers went on strike at the new factory site and destroyed part of its administrative office because 
the security guards of the factory had beaten workers.
15
  
In terms of social insurance, we found that Pakistani and Chinese factory-based football stitchers 
mostly have some form of social insurance. In Pakistan, this included health, pension, and 
unemployment benefits whereas this only related to pension benefits in China. Regarding centre and 
home-based stitchers in Pakistan and India, these were generally not covered by any social 
insurance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there a similar situation prevails amongst home-based 
stitchers in Jiangsu province. In Pakistan however, we found two exceptions where centre-based 
stitchers were provided with medical insurance.  One was stitchers producing fair trade footballs 
whereas some stitchers worked for a local factory that paid for their stitchers’ medical insurance 
and their children’s basic education.  
While social insurance has typically been associated with formal (factory-based) work settings, we 
also investigated whether centre and home-based stitchers had any kind of social safety nets 
provided by local NGOs. In Pakistan, we found that stitchers across all work forms reported that 
                                                          
14
 Source - http://epaper.nddaily.com/I/html/2009-05/07/content_783623.htm; accessed  2 April 2010. 
15
 Source - http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4999f0bf0100it2k.html, accessed 2 April 2010. 
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NGOs were sometimes present in their localities. In India however, we did not find any evidence of 
NGOs working to assist football stitchers with the exception of two particular villages outside of 
Jalandhar.  
 
6. Factors Affecting Differences in Work Conditions for Football Stitchers  
In the previous section we outlined what appeared to be the most significant similarities and 
differences in the working conditions of Pakistani, Indian, and Chinese football stitchers. We now 
turn to the question of what explains these similarities and differences. Our analysis is structured on 
the basis of our analytical framework on industrial upgrading/downgrading, global value chain 
governance, and production organization in national institutional contexts. As suggested earlier, 
global and local factors may mutually condition, reinforce or contradict one another in ways that 
create distinct outcomes for workers. Here, we set out how some of these factors might effect work 
conditions.  
a) Industrial Upgrading                         
Perhaps the most significant difference in the work conditions of Pakistani, Indian and Chinese 
football stitchers is that Chinese factory-based workers earn significantly higher wages than football 
stitchers in India and Pakistan. Part of the explanation for this difference appears to the process 
upgrading undertaken by Chinese manufacturers. Chinese football manufacturing became 
prominent on the global stage with the invention of machine-stitching technology and the 
emergence of mechanised football manufacturing plants in China. This resulted in a dramatic 
increase in productivity in comparison with hand stitched football production in Pakistan and India. 
Our firm level qualitative data suggests that a Chinese factory-based machine stitcher can stitch on 
average 39.8 balls a day whereas the average Pakistani hand-stitcher could stitch 4.5 balls a day and 
the Indian hand-stitcher 3.9 balls. This implies that the daily productivity of Chinese factory-based 
stitcher was 8.6 times higher than their Pakistani counterparts and 10 times higher than their Indian 
counterparts.  If we adjust for the number of hours worked per day, we find a similar story.  The 
hourly productivity of machine-based Chinese stitchers in a large export-oriented factory working 
in teams was approximately 6.9 times higher than Pakistani hand-stitchers and 7.8 times higher than 
that of Indian hand-stitchers.  
Sialkot’s manufacturers have traditionally specialized in the niche-production of high quality hand-
stitched balls. They have, however, lost a significant portion of the world market in training and 
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promotional balls in recent years to Chinese competitors. While Pakistani manufacturers continue to 
emphasize that hand-stitching produces higher quality football, Chinese manufacturers, however, 
have realized that it is price and branding rather the quality of footballs alone that are the 
determining factors in the purchasing decisions of end consumers, especially in the mass market for 
training, recreational and promotional balls. As globally branded firms play a key role in the 
marketing of these footballs, consumers base their purchasing decisions primarily on the basis of 
the brand name – e.g., Nike or Adidas – and price rather than whether a ball is hand- or machine-
stitched. 
As Pakistani and Indian manufacturers have not introduced machine-stitching technology on an 
industry-wide basis, they are unable to match the productivity levels of Chinese football 
manufacturers and thus forced to squeeze wages of their football stitchers. As our research in both 
Sialkot and Jalandhar indicated, football stitchers experienced only minor nominal wage increases 
in the last five to ten years. Consequently, real wages taking into account inflationary pressures had 
declined.  
Process upgrading – in the form of the invention of machine-stitching in China – may have also 
reduced the OHS risks that Chinese football stitchers face in comparison with their South Asian 
counterparts. In Pakistan and India, the vast majority of hand-stitchers that we interviewed 
complained of injuries to their hands and lower parts of their arms caused by pricking of the needle, 
as well as back pain arising from sitting for long hours crouched in the same position on the floor or 
on low stools. Similarly, the few Chinese stitchers who did mention any OHS problems tended to 
be the ones involved in the last step of the machine-stitching process where the football has to be 
closed using handstitching. In China, only 2 out of regular 25 machine-stitchers reported any OHS 
problems as a result of their involvement in football stitching. Chinese machine stitchers usually sit 
on chairs along production lines using sewing machines. In our view, the high rates of OHS 
problems reported in Pakistan and India, and their being less widespread in China, may be 
explained by the different types of stitching techniques used in football manufacturing: hand-
stitching vs. machine-stitching and the sitting positions of workers.   
b) Global Value Chain Governance 
It also appears that CSR and sourcing strategies adopted in the interaction between international 
buyers and local suppliers may affect work conditions for football stitchers in each country. This 
can have both positive and negative effects, creating winners and losers amongst stitchers 
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participating in different work forms in the industry. The decline of child labour in football stitching 
in Sialkot and Jalandhar over the last 15 years can largely be related to a variety of CSR initiatives 
within the Pakistan and Indian football manufacturing industries. First, child labour monitoring has 
been introduced in both clusters since the end of the 1990s. While the effectiveness of these 
monitoring mechanisms have been the subject of both policy and academic discussion (see e.g., 
Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010), their establishment has brought about a general impression that 
the involvement of children in football stitching is illegal. In Pakistan in particular, the involvement 
of children in centre-based football stitching will have direct livelihood implications for those 
centres as they are likely to be closed if child stitchers are found within them. Second, various NGO 
awareness raising campaigns in Sialkot and Jalandhar have changed the perception of child labour 
within local stitching communities. Most stitching parents felt that involving children in football 
stitching was not helpful to their child’s future. On the one hand, it would compromise their 
schooling. On the other hand, involving them in football stitching from an early age would mean 
that they could be restricted to an occupation that was turning out to be increasingly unviable with 
falling real wages and declining levels of work over the last decade.  
The factory-based model of football stitching facilitates compliance with the international CSR 
requirement of Western buyers. Generally, these brands prefer that production is in-sourced in 
factory-based settings where wages, work hours, overtime payments etc. can be more easily 
controlled than in the informal urban and rural settings of Sialkot and Jalandhar. Hence, the factory-
based model of production facilitates the access of workers to benefits such as social insurance 
(health, pension, unemployment etc.) and overtime payments which are much more widespread 
under the factory-based model of football stitching in Guangdong than in the centre-based and 
home-based settings in Sialkot and Jalandhar. Similarly, we observed that the factory-based model 
of football stitching in Sialkot and Guangdong allowed workers to collectively organize 
spontaneous strikes in relation to the delayed or incorrect payment of monthly wages (in Pakistan) 
as well as factory closures-relocations (in China).  
Yet the introduction of the factory-based model of football stitching in Pakistan has also had some 
negative, and unintended, consequences. Nike is the only international brand that insists that 
football stitching must take place inside the factory premises of its supplier in Sialkot. While this 
may help workers obtain the minimum wage, social security, and overtime payment prescribed 
under Pakistani law, it does not take into account the socio-economic reality faced by many of the 
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female stitchers living in the villages surrounding Sialkot who are unable to commute to and from 
Nike’s supplier factory due to patriarchal norms imposed by their male family members.  
Consequently, there are no female stitchers employed by the Nike supplier. 
 
Our findings from China illustrate similar kinds of trade-offs in relation to the implementation of 
CSR requirements of international brands and their effects on workers’ conditions. In some 
factories supplying either the leading brands (Nike or Adidas) or non-sports brands (such as Disney) 
we found that the implementation of CSR requirements placed limits on the number of hours that 
stitchers could work a day. In these cases, the maximum number of daily work hours was 10, six 
days a week with Sunday off. However, as they were only allowed to work ten hours a day, football 
stitchers in these factories tended to earn slightly lower monthly wages than stitchers in another 
factory that did not appear to face similar CSR pressures from its buyers. In fact, this factory was a 
subcontractor to a medium-sized factory supplying footballs to an international non-sports brand. 
Here football stitchers worked an average of 12 hours a day, usually seven days a week.  As all 
factories, not only in China but also in Pakistan and India, operate on the basis of the piece rate 
system, the monthly wages of stitchers working in this factory was somewhat higher than those of 
their counterparts working in the Guangdong factories where CSR requirements are more strictly 
enforced. However, the hourly wages of football stitchers in this factory tended to be lower than in 
the ‘CSR compliant’ factories that supply the mega, small- and medium-sized, and non-sports 
brands.  
Producers in Sialkot, Jalandhar, and Guangdong province also face different sourcing pressures 
through the global supply chain. On the one hand, international demand for footballs fluctuates. It 
peaks in the run-up to the European Cup and the World Cup and then drops immediately after these 
tournaments end. International demand also changes in relation to the larger cycles of international 
capitalism, such as the global financial crisis that hit the international football industry in early 
2009. As all three production locations produce footballs in the promotional segment, they also 
faced downwards pressures on price as international buyers can source these products from all three 
countries. Hence, price competition in this segment of the market is intense. In sum, local 
manufacturers have to be able to adjust their production levels to changing international demand, 
they tend to face constant downwards pressure on prices, they need to develop new footballs and 
football manufacturing methods, and they have to comply with international CSR standards if they 
want to sell into the high-end of the international football market.   
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c) Local Forms of Production Organization  
In our view, local production organization within Sialkot, Jalandhar, and Guangdong play an 
important role in the ability of local manufacturers to cope with the pressures that emanate from the 
global value chains into which they are inserted. Producers in Sialkot and Jalandhar have built their 
international competitiveness on the basis of cluster-based agglomeration economies. In contrast, 
manufacturers in Guangdong province have built their export capability on a mass-production 
model. These different forms of industrial organization have implications for the work conditions of 
football stitchers in all three settings.  
 
Small-firm industrial clusters may be able to compete in the international economy by specializing 
in small batch production for niche markets, and splitting up production processes between large 
numbers of smaller units that are located within a narrowly defined geographical area. In this form 
of industrial organization, subcontracting and the use of job-working are extensive in order to meet 
the changing demands of international buyers.  
 
This form of industrial organization was well-suited for the kinds of demands that local 
manufacturers in Sialkot and Jalandhar faced from the early 1970s until the mid-1990s. In the early 
1970s, as international demand for footballs began to surge in both Sialkot and Jalandhar, it soon 
became obvious for local entrepreneurs that it was no longer viable to keep the most labour-
intensive part of production inside the factories. As labour laws were strengthened in the early 
1970s, and industrial strikes became more frequent (in Sialkot), local entrepreneurs felt that it was 
too expensive to retain permanent employees at times when football demand was low. This led to 
the sub-contracting of stitching from local factories to the homes of the football stitchers. This 
added to the flexibility for producers to respond to changing demands as well as allow them to 
avoid social protection provisions within the labour laws. At the same time, placing a network of 
contractors in between the football factories and the stitchers themselves limited the risks of 
industrial disputes that could disrupt production and/or lead to increased demands for better work 
conditions in the industry. In our interviews with home- and centre-based football stitchers in 
Sialkot and Jalandhar we asked whether they ever engaged in any kind of bargaining over stitching 
rates. Often the answer was that while football stitchers did complain about the rates to their 
contractors, the contractor would reply that rates were fixed by the factory and could not be 
changed. The institutionalization of sub-contracting made it very difficult for trade unions to form 
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and collective bargaining to emerge. In terms of producing outcomes for workers, outsourcing can 
result in the risks associated with global capitalism being pushed down to the lowest point of the 
football stitching chain. The outsourcing of hand-stitching to centre and home-based locations tends 
to reduce the incomes of football stitchers, resulting in income and occupational insecurity.   
 
We believe that part of the explanation for the longer hours put in by Chinese football stitchers 
relate to their being migrant workers whereas their counterparts in Sialkot and Jalandhar tend to be 
local residents. Most of the workers labouring in the Guangdong factories are migrant workers. 
They have often left their home provinces, and their families, to come to Guangdong in order to 
save as much as possible in the shortest possible time span. With wages paid on a piece-rated basis 
they can earn more by working longer hours.  Hence, even with limits on working hours in place in 
some factories, with overtime Chinese stitchers work more hours per day than their counterparts in 
Sialkot and Jalandhar. There are no migrant workers in Sialkot and very few in Jalandhar from the 
Indian state of Bihar. Instead, Sialkot’s and Jalandhar’s football stitchers work and reside in the 
same locality with their families. Hence, it may be more difficult for them to work more than 7-8 
hours a day if they have to spend time engaged in domestic and other forms of labour. This is 
especially so for rural based stitchers who may have farm and off-farm based activities to undertake 
alongside their football stitching work. In Sialkot and Jalandhar, both male and female centre and 
home-based stitchers explained that they would not want to work in factory-based settings as they 
preferred the flexibility that centre and/or home-based work allowed them. This allowed them to 
come and go anytime and to attend to domestic issues during regular work hours.    
 
Conclusion               
This paper sought to provide empirical insights into labour in global production networks using the 
case of the global football manufacturing industry. We undertook a comparative investigation of 
work conditions amongst football stitchers in Pakistan, India, and China and explain why these 
work conditions are similar or different across these countries. In doing so, we argued that the 
similarities and differences in work conditions of football stitchers can be explained with reference 
to the intertwined factors of industrial upgrading/downgrading, global value chain governance, and 
different types of local production organization.  
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It appears that Chinese football stitchers (in Guangdong) are better off than their South Asian 
counterparts in Sialkot and Jalandhar. Factory-based football stitchers in Guangdong earn 
significantly higher monthly wages than football stitchers in Sialkot and Jalandhar. They can save 
part of their earnings, which only some stitchers in Pakistan can do while virtually no football 
stitchers in Jalandhar are able to put any money aside from their stitching work. Chinese factory-
based football stitchers are much less exposed to occupational health and safety risks than their 
counterparts in Pakistan and India. While freedom of association and collective bargaining are 
largely absent in all three production locations, Chinese factory-based stitchers in Guangdong 
appear better able to organize protests and strikes that pressure their employers than the vast 
majority of football stitchers in Sialkot and Jalandhar who work across a large geographical area, 
mostly without any direct relationship between themselves and the factory whose balls they stitch. 
In terms of compliance with international CSR demands, it also appears that Chinese factory-based 
football stitchers tend to have medical insurance, unemployment insurance, and overtime payment 
than their counterparts in Sialkot and Jalandhar. The only exception in South Asia is a supplier to 
Nike that has in-sourced the process of football stitcher in response to pressures from Nike. Hence, 
it is only in this factory that football stitchers enjoy similar levels of social protection as their 
counterparts in China. The only aspect where the work conditions of Chinese football stitchers in 
Guangdong may be considered worse than in Sialkot and Jalandhar is in relation to work hours. 
Football stitchers in Guangdong put in longer hours than their South Asian counterparts.  
However, if we take a broader view of work conditions through the perspective of football stitchers 
themselves, we arrive at a more mixed assessment. First, during the period of our study it appeared 
as if factory closures in the Chinese football manufacturing industry were more frequent than in 
Jalandhar or Sialkot, leaving several thousand workers unemployed. Second, while our 
investigation took place during a financial downturn in 2009/early 2010, football stitchers in 
Guangdong generally have to put in longer hours and experience greater work intensity than their 
counterparts in Sialkot and Jalandhar which may result in long-term health effects that we have not 
been able to document as part of this study. Third, Chinese football stitchers working as migrant 
laborers in Guangdong province are generally denied having a family life throughout the year. 
While this may be reflected in higher financial earnings for themselves and their families in the 
short-term, it is difficult to assess what the long-term emotional and psychological implications of 
physical separation are for married stitchers, their spouses, and children.  
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This raises a final challenge posed by this study. While it may be that Chinese football stitchers in 
Guangdong province are better off in terms of their monthly earnings, any assessment of ‘better off’ 
or ‘worse off’ depends upon the yardstick being used. Working as a football stitcher – whether in 
Pakistan, India, and China – is contingent upon receiving relatively low wages. Improvements in 
work outcomes for labour within the industry require an increase not only in productivity but also in 
wage rates. Improving wages requires collective bargaining pressures by workers, and this remains 
relatively limited and especially so in India and Pakistan. Moreover, these concerns have been 
outside the purview labour standards and codes of conduct interventions in the football 
manufacturing sector.  
This study suggests that codes of conduct focusing on specific aspects of labour standards do not in 
themselves generate improved livelihoods and working conditions for football stitchers. Moreover, 
while compliance pressures from the leading global brands may have some positive gains, these 
may well be outweighed by the competitive pressures and risks that brands force down on their 
suppliers, and their suppliers then push down to workers. Some categories of workers may become 
especially vulnerable. To bring about real improvements in working conditions the policy debate 
has to go beyond labour standards and CSR compliance and engage with the economic, 
technological and social upgrading that could potentially generate sustained improvements in real 
wages and working conditions for workers. ‘Decent work’ requires enabling rights as well as 
productivity gains, and it calls for greater understanding of the agency and perspectives of workers 
in global production networks. 
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